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**SUSTAINING WARFIGHTING ABILITY:
WHILE ACHIEVING
TOTAL FORCE REDUCTION**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT J. GRAEBENER
United States Army**

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

SUSTAINING WARFIGHTING ABILITY: WHILE
ACHIEVING TOTAL FORCE REDUCTION

by

Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Graebener
United States Army

Colonel Robert C. Coon
Project Advisor

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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ABSTRACT

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This paper examines how training has become the center of gravity of the U.S. Army and proposes that it should be the basis for determining future reductions in force structure. The transition from a threat-based to a training-based design will ensure the decay to readiness which historically follows any major Army reductions will not occur. Training is a natural target for reduction since the benefits associated with a highly trained or poorly trained unit is only realized during combat. Using the Combat Training Center(CTC) training model as a point of departure, the minimum number of Active Army divisions are proposed to ensure warfighting readiness is maintained well into the future. To complete the discussion of future force structure the National Guard's role in combat operations is analyzed with recommendations on how the Guard can become a full team player. The bottomline is the reality check applied when these proposals are compared with the historical relationship the militia and regular force have had since the founding of this nation.

NOTE

Superscripts¹ refer to
endnotes, subscripts,
refer to footnotes.

CHAPTER 1

The Army is reaching a critical crossroads. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the sudden shift in focus from international to domestic issues with the subsequent swing in budget priorities, and a new Democratic administration whose election campaign indicated the potential for radical change in the way the military conducts its affairs are some of the major challenges facing the Army.¹ The course it chooses or has chosen for it will determine if the United States Army will be a player in the new world order or just a survivor.

Why a player rather than a survivor? First, two definitions: a player plays in or makes a practice of playing against or with others in a specified game; a survivor continues to exist after others have ceased to do so.² For the Army this is the difference between being poised, trained and ready for the next war or preoccupied with its own organizational existence and ill-prepared to face those national emergencies not yet

¹This strategy first surfaced when the author attended the Chemical Bank visit during the War College's New York trip on 13 October 1992.

identified.

If the Army does nothing, just maintaining the status quo, it will be a survivor, inheriting a course of action prescribed for it. The more difficult and complex challenge is to be a player. The current Army leadership not only must provide the vision of the future end-state of the Army, but also determine the appropriate means for achieving that end-state.

The purpose of this paper is to offer a new methodology, an alternative to the Cold War's threat-based methodology, for determining the Total Army's optimal force structure for the 21st Century. The methodology uses two critical variables, sustainment of warfighting readiness and the National Guard's role in combat operations to posit those changes to U. S. Army force structure which will better prepare it for the international and domestic challenges of the future. The changes; one to the heavy/light maneuver force and the other to the National Guard focus on the combat role of the Army.

Why the combat role?

1. Combat is the only reason for the existence of the U.S. Army.
2. Sustainment of the Army's warfighting ability is threatened by today's environment and most susceptible to degradation.
3. Degradation translates to higher casualties in wartime.

This paper treats sustainment of warfighting ability as the continued execution of Combat Training Center(CTC) based training

programs from battalion to Corps,²; and, the capability to execute maneuver warfare on a world-wide regional basis, on order.

The proposed changes will not be acceptable to all, but the author will show that any change made by Army leadership must balance defense considerations with economic and political considerations. This goal is ambitious, to reach it the reader will be taken on a journey. The journey is necessary to identify only those issues, factors or capabilities which are the most important for sustainment of warfighting capabilities. First, an understanding of the challenges and the American public's expectations facing the future Army will provide the reader with the commander's intent(the general guidance by which supporting decisions can be made). Next, understanding the significance of how today's training strategy evolved(mentioned earlier as the CTC training program) provides why today's training ethos must be sustained by Army leadership regardless of the cuts and reductions made in the Total Army's force structure, research and development(R&D)accounts, or roles and missions. The final step of the journey is the American notion of the National Guard or militia; its strengths and weaknesses, and how it can best be utilized in future conflicts. The reader, with the concepts gained from his or her journey, will be presented with how

²The training, in place to the Corps level, should not discount current plans which envision simulation assisted training up to the national security level.

changes should be applied to the Total Force., The ultimate goal being to sustain warfighting ability while positioning the force to face future challenges. This paper is not for the faint of "mind," the complexities and enormity of the decisions facing today's leaders are not easy to make, let alone explain.

³The term "Total Force" is used even though this paper addresses changes to the Active Component(AC) and National Guard(NG). The combat orientation directs the major changes to the AC and NG, where virtually all combat units are located.

CHAPTER 2

The American Public and the Future Army

The term "crossroads" conveys the impression of many paths which can be taken to arrive at a given destination., Before describing the "road map" the reader must be sensitive to the role the American psyche plays in focusing the people's attention on the importance of military preparedness.

A three-phase process using the fall of the USSR will convey the idea (figure 1). Phase one, the significant emotional event: In late 1989 and early 1990 the Wall was torn down and the

Phase 1: Significant emotional event.
Phase 2: Realistic assessment.
Phase 3: Reactive assessment.

Figure 1

Process for Evaluating Military Preparedness.

Communist regimes in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were disintegrating. Phase two, the realistic assessment: The continued Russian military presence in eastern Germany and the thousands of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles fragmented throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) were still

⁴The reader might identify a better means to achieve these ends, that is perfectly acceptable, since the best answers to complex issues are normally the result of ideas built from other ideas.

a concern for NATO and the United States. The weak economy in the United States and the gradual drawdown in military forces followed a schedule to balance the needs for maintaining a creditable force and the needs to gradually reduce defense spending and the influx of prior servicemen into the civilian job market. Phase three, the reactive assessment: As issues, previously overshadowed by East-West detente and strategic deterrence, moved to the forefront, the gradualism espoused in stage two fades at a rapid rate and the proactive controlled policies are replaced by reactive uncontrolled policies (in the past this process left the armed forces in a crippled state of readiness).³

Applying the same three-phase process to a crisis ten to twenty years from now provides the future template for determining the end-state of the United States Army.

Future Template

The future template for the Army begins with its future environment. For the purposes of this paper the future environment will occur between 1998 and 2012. Phase one, the significant emotional event: A real or perceived regional or economic crisis will pose a threat to U. S. national interests. The sophisticated United States response will be predicated on the tenets found in the Weinberger Doctrine of the 1980's.⁴

³Recent trends demonstrate that the Weinberger Doctrine can be effectively used to enter (Desert Storm) or stay out of (Bosnia) conflicts. Whether the rational approach will be adhered to by U. S. leadership is the question. One indication that it will be a guide for the future is the strong public sentiment concerning

Phase two, the realistic assessment: Given the critical domestic issues of the early 1990's, national health care, growing national debt and decaying infrastructure, to name a few, the United States cut further into the budgets of the military services. This prolonged condition facilitated by media reports, led the public to the realistic assessment that the Army will require a significant period to mobilize and train an expanding force to match its structure and readiness of circa 1991 levels(comparable to the force provided the Desert Storm/Desert Shield campaign). Phase three, the reactive assessment. As national security issues, previously overshadowed by domestic concerns, move to the forefront the gradualism espoused in stage two fades at a rapid rate and proactive controlled mobilization and train up policies are replaced by a set of reactive, short notice, crisis response policies(in the past this approach created Task Force Smith and the massacre in the Ia Drang).⁵

The Army leadership of the 21st Century faces a more critical series of events than today's leadership because an Army inflexible towards making changes today will cause the soldiers required to fight tomorrow's battle to pay for this intransigence with their blood while their leaders attempt to correct past deficiencies. This environmental perspective helps to identify what the Army of the 21st Century must be capable of and must maintain after a prolonged period of budgetary neglect and

minimal casualties for America's soldiers. Recent guest lectures at the War College demonstrated that this sentiment has not gone un-noticed by senior Army leaders.

peacetime focus on domestic concerns(i.e. drug interdiction, national disaster relief, and related missions): **Warfighting readiness thru training.**

The Army must guard against losing its training ethos. The reality of this condition in today's environment must be understood. The quality of today's training, the proficiency of executing tactical and operational combat plans, up to the corps level cannot be translated into tangible dollars or other resources that can be measured or defended against by those intent on reducing military budgets. Only when America goes to war does it realize the "tangible results" - the number of casualties which are paid for by the future generation of America's youth. Leaders at all levels, active and reserve, must understand this message and convey it very clearly to the public and political leadership of this country.

The Army of Today: Vision and Traits

"The Army of tomorrow will be more than a smaller version of the Cold War Army. Although it will decrease in size it will retain the capabilities that made it successful in Desert Storm. The Army will remain a trained and ready [Total F]orce, capable of decisive victory. It will continue to operate across the continuum of military operations and will continue to reflect U.S. will and commitment at home and abroad...."

NOTE: Brackets incl. caps added by author for clarity.

GEN Gordon R. Sullivan's Strategic Vision.

The Chief of Staff of the Army's vision is a realistic portrayal of the future Army. When applied to the future

template it clearly identifies where the Army must be by the end of the next decade.⁶ The six combat imperatives assist in the identification process by indicating where the emphasis must be placed.⁷ Quality soldiers are motivated by tough, realistic training exercises and sustained at appropriate force levels by quality of life programs when led by competent leaders. Leaders become competent by gaining technical and tactical expertise and leading units through tough combined arms training exercises. Tough training means *challenging training*, measured against one Total Force standard. Combat training centers and increased reliance on simulators from the individual/crew level to the operational level and joint, combined and coalition staff levels improve command and control interactions. The high-tech simulations arena is a part of the *modern equipment* procured to provide the force with the technological edge over the future enemy. The *force mix* provides the flexibility to execute the complete spectrum of ground warfare missions from crisis response to extended mobilization and training of follow-on forces. The *doctrine* provides the linkages, not only to effectively execute ground maneuver warfare, but to link the services and coalitions in joint and combined operations.

The combat imperatives can be described within the context of the current reductions in military spending. Providing

⁶The discussion of combat imperatives is key to developing the force of the future as it is the author's contention that the imperatives are the road signs which will provide the necessary guidance for attaining the end-state.

superior equipment and challenging training draws the best people into the Army. Providing challenging training develops the competent leaders and the setting for improving American fighting doctrine and force structure. What is the easiest to target for reduction? Training. One does not have to do anything and training suffers. It is short-lived, needs constant attention, and its only effect can be measured in battle. Force structure and equipment have many champions(e.g., industry, Congress, state governments) and are easy to measure and comprehend. One must work relatively hard to reduce force structure and equipment. Champions take sides, pro and con, and fight for tangible results. They can measure their success by the number of dollars or jobs they save for their constituents. Force structure and equipment are also easy to compare. If a belligerent country is mobilizing for war, improvements in either of these two areas are easily identified and can be countered by concurrent mobilization. This is not easily accomplished in the training environment.

CHAPTER 3

Training, training ethos, CTC programs...these have been addressed frequently in the preceding pages. Most readers at this point would agree that training must be protected, that sustainment of warfighting skills is paramount. The alert reader has identified that training is the common linkage between the combat imperatives and the quality of soldiers, leaders and doctrine. Yet, understanding training theory and applying training theory is worlds apart. This chapter will expand on the following sentences mentioned on page ten: "One does not have to do anything and training suffers. It is short-lived, needs constant attention, and its only effect can be measured in battle."

Background

The Army's ability to carry out wartime missions is measured in terms of manpower, material and training.⁸ "Training is especially critical because it is the process by which the Army unites organized manpower and material resources within a doctrinal framework to attain levels of performance that can dictate the difference between success and failure in battle."⁹ This paradigm underscores the objective of training. The amazing part is it wasn't until the 1970's that the Army got serious about improving its antiquated training system and attaining the proper objective.

There were a number of factors which came together in the

1970's which brought about the transformation in how the Army approached training. The debacle of Vietnam was in progress, the technological revolution was underway and the Army visionaries of that period realized that the Army, in order to be prepared for future conflict, had to improve its overall readiness.¹⁰ The Army Training Program that was in place at that time had not changed significantly since World War I.¹¹ The program was based on the lessons learned from the world wars, particularly the mobilization problems associated with building the armies which fought in World War II. The mobilization model prescribed the subjects to be taught and the number of hours required to train recruits to reach minimal acceptable levels before being sent off to combat.¹² Standards of performance were not provided, nor apparently understood by the Army corporate body at large. The effectiveness of collective training was highly dependent on the ability of the unit commander.⁷ The focus was on company training, so the army of the 1970's did not provide a training discipline or common experience for commanders and staffs above the battalion level. The officer, once he or she left the battalion, gained collective training experience from a primarily administrative environment. Coupled with the vision of future

⁷The mobilization model provided prescribed methods for **training the individual soldier**. Collective training was considered an art. The phrase "leaders are born and not made" was popular throughout this period. This contributed to the corporate mindset that the commander, especially at battalion and above, would become proficient at tactics and warfare through schooling and an undefined "inner self". One can imagine some officers were better at the inner self part than others.

war, this approach would mean suicide for Army units. Future war was based on short-notice response; this meant the Army could not rely on a model where acceptable readiness levels were not maintained at all times by all levels of command.¹³

TRADOC is Born

The view towards a better training system was evident by the creation of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973. Using its creation as the start point, a short history of TRADOC will provide the reader with an appreciation of how the training improvement process evolved.⁸

Phase I (1973 - 1977): Realizing that the next time the United States would go to war it would have to fight outnumbered and win; Army leadership began a concerted drive to establish a creditable doctrine with the unique character of the American value system and a organization able to harness technology to create synergistic systems able to survive on the battlefield.¹⁴ This period saw the publication of the field manual (FM 100-5), titled Operations. The training methods under development were published as the Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPs) and Skill Qualification Tests (SQTs). The ARTEP was the first instance that the Army set out a performance oriented program for collective training.¹⁵ Complementing these publications were

⁸The author has used the same phases described in Ms. Chapman's book. License has been taken in the last phase by including current events.

⁹Collective training now had published standards, a considerable hurdle, given the legacy of "commanders are born not made". The training system was starting to identify fact from

the initiatives to re-evaluate the requirements for training land. The increase in size, tempo and lethality of the battlefield defined the need for a training area which could provide the battlefield realism and space envisioned to train for the battles of tomorrow.¹⁶ The National Training Center (NTC) concept was born.

Phase II (1977 - 1981): The initiatives taken during this period in TRADOC's history can be described as the development of major improvements to the original vision. Feedback from the field by units working with the ARTEP identified a number of weaknesses. Units were not sufficiently resourced to provide adequate evaluation teams.¹⁷ The teams were built from sister battalions whose degree of evaluation expertise were varied.¹⁰ Garrison and post detail requirements were competing with training preparations. A training management system was developed to provide units with a structure for assessing priorities for mission support vis-a-vis training readiness. Leaders began exploring the concept of large unit training with exercises at Fort Irwin, California. Improvements continued with a major doctrinal shift to the Air-Land Battle (ALB) concept and upgrades within TRADOC were made by filling the training bases with top quality personnel.

fiction.

¹⁰The Army still persisted in focusing the training experience at the battalion level. The insight or perhaps courage to require senior leaders (brigade and higher) to be placed under the training evaluation microscope had not been realized at this point.

Phase III(1981 - 1986): The NTC's first battalion rotation occurred in this period(1981) as well as the publication of the ALB doctrine(1982). This venue provided the Army with a training area where it could synchronize leader training with unit training in the application of ALB doctrine up to the battalion level.¹⁸ The positioning of a professional opposing force(OPFOR) and evaluator cadre solved the ARTEP resourcing issues. It caused the maturation of the Army training system by creating an environment which not only motivated the soldier and leader during the exercise but gave a focus and direction for units preparing for their first rotation or returning for their second rotation.¹¹ The value of the NTC experience, especially for the armor/mechanized task force, provided the follow-on impetus for two additional training areas. The Joint Readiness Training Center(JRTC) for light forces and the Combined Maneuver Training Center(CMTC) in Germany for heavy forces deployed in NATO. These centers had their first rotational units train in 1986 and 1989, respectively.

¹¹What is the value of having the NTC? It is being able to provide the battalion commander with the time and space to synchronize all of the combat multipliers available to him. The combat multipliers are referred to as the seven battlefield operating systems(BOS); intelligence, combat service support, maneuver, fire support, mobility/survivability, C², and air defense. The commander was no longer dealing with the theoretical or administrative application of force, but was required to successfully integrate them within the chaos of simulated combat to complete his mission. Success at the NTC was determined by whether the commander(as well as others in their specific roles) built upon his fourteen day rotation and learned something, regardless of who ultimately won the battle.

The ARTEPs further evolution produced the mission training plans(MTPs). The publication of the MTPs provided an easily understood format and menu for identifying resource needs, such as time and space. The unit commanders and staffs were already overwhelmed with facts and figures but the "user friendly" MTP gave them a painless means for preparing to execute complex training tasks.¹⁹

Phase IV(1986 - 1991): The value of the NTC experience on unit warfighting ability was so great that it soon became apparent that brigade and higher organizations could benefit from similar training.¹² Adequate land was available to train brigades but impractical for divisions and corps. The Battle Command Training Program(BCTP), a computer assisted simulation, was the obvious answer for effectively training these large staff organizations.¹³ The success of BCTP led to its inclusion(along with all of the maneuver training centers) into the CTC program. Collective training, from squad to corps, was effectively placed under one program.²⁰ The acid test of this visionary strategy was confirmed by the impressive results of joint maneuver forces during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Training management continued its evolutionary path with the

¹²This was a courageous step by the Army. Moving the training evaluation microscope to higher command levels met much resistance. The comfort taken by some when promoted up and out of the training environment had ended. Commanders at all levels would have to perform to established standards.

¹³Simulations have proven to be an effective alternative to field exercises. Do not conclude that simulation training can replace field training, particularly below brigade.

introduction of the FM 25 - 100 series of manuals.²¹ The ability to plan unit training in coordination with other battalion missions had been established in an earlier phase, but now the division and then the corps commander could contribute through the prioritization of training resources. The synchronization process stipulated in doctrine for combat operations was found to have similar application in the training management environment.

Phase V(1991 - Present): The experience gained in combat and in training during the past twenty years has provided the next challenge which the Army leadership is currently addressing. The coordination of unified operations with external agencies.¹⁴

Post conflict termination conditions cannot be accomplished within the unified military environment exclusively. Action by State, CIA, NSC and others have to be synchr nized. Planning and coordination must be thought through before the situation presents itself. Current initiatives within the services indicate higher level simulation exercises are being developed to pursue this finding.

¹⁴The reader will note an interesting trend. Army training evolution has expanded the scope of training experiences. BCTP required three-star generals to meet standards of performance. The challenge of tomorrow is to provide four-star commanders and their civilian counterparts with the same opportunity.

CTC Training Value

"No American soldier must ever die in combat because we failed to provide the tough, realistic training demanded by the battlefields of today."

General Carl E. Vuono
October 1989

Experience in combat operations coupled with CTC lessons learned have moved the Army to the edge of the training envelope. The value of training with the CTC system cannot be more succinctly described than what General Vuono said to the Association of the United States Army in October of 1989.¹⁵ Most importantly, this training ethos permeates throughout the Army body politic. The Army understands this fundamental statement which reflects the public sentiment widely publicized during Desert Storm: **Casualties in war must be kept to a minimum!** Open sources identify this as a strategic value or center of gravity for the United States.¹⁶ The short war and minimal casualty

¹⁵Warfighting at the individual and squad level will always occur, and casualties will result. The application of combat power at the battalion and higher command, if not understood and practiced, will only add to those casualties. Said another way, the ability to synchronize combat power is directly related to the number of casualties sustained.

¹⁶Center of gravity of an armed force refers to those sources of strength or balance. It is that characteristic, capability, or locality from which the force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Clausewitz defined it as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends". Its attack is--or should be--the focus of all operations.

U. S. Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 100 - 5 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 5 May 1986), 179.

requirement are part of the American psyche. Sustainment of warfighting ability within the Total Force will ensure it does not become a liability.

The benchmark for sustaining warfighting capabilities

Recall the statement made earlier in the chapter. "One does not have to do anything and training suffers." What is the answer for the Army during a period when competing resources are pulling at training readiness?

The Army must meet these two requirements: One, the Army must maintain its Combat Training Centers and it must ensure that units have adequate time to prepare for their rotation. The number of divisions can be reduced, the force structure can be modified, but the litmus test should be: Do the warfighting units have the CTC to train at? When the NTC was on the drawing board Army planners scheduled twenty-one, two-battalion, rotations per year.²² It was never attained. Ten to twelve rotations per year will more than justify the retention of the evaluator cadre and professional OPFOR. Chapter five will present a quantitative analysis of how the future Army base force can be tailored, based on the CTC model.

Two, the Army must continue the requirement that senior leadership meet training standards at their respective levels of command. BCTP exercises must be maintained for three-star corps commanders. Slippage in maintaining these skills will gain momentum throughout the chain of command and small unit training will feel the impact as well.

The Army leadership will know it has failed to sustain warfighting ability if either of these two requirements are curtailed.

CTC Training Awareness

The Department of Defense stipulated in its final report to Congress on the conduct of the war in the Persian Gulf that, "it took a long time to build the high quality force and system used to successfully conclude the war".²³ Do not overlook the type of war that was prosecuted. Highly mobile, offensive in nature and characterized by low casualty rates. This is the type of warfare of the future, particularly where vital national interests are at stake.²⁴

High quality training was one of the most important contributors to preparedness of the U. S. forces in the Gulf.²⁵ How does the Army sustain the quality? The Army leadership must set the methods for sustainment. The near term challenge is already upon us. The good news is the competency of the senior military leadership is superb and their understanding of training and what is at stake is based on their own personal experience. The bad news is found in the long term challenge. The practical experience gained by Army leaders will erode over time. Future leaders will not have the expertise to set the most effective methods for sustainment. Lessons, once learned in war, will now be learned in the school house. If the training tempo, or the CTC experience described above is reduced, a degradation will occur within the Army, not only on how to prosecute war but how

to train effectively. This degradation could be permanent or take a long time to correct. History has proven, many times over, that the only motivational force able to correct this degradation is the threat of war or war itself.

Figure 2 provides an illustrative example. The evolution towards modern military training occurred over a twenty year period(1973-1993). The officer's corps, which is directly responsible for unit collective training, has been exposed in varying degrees to this new system(based on an individual's length of service). The officer currently in his or her majority has benefited from the CTC system and virtually grown up in the new training environment. His or her ability to grow and improve upon the training system is unbounded, if military training continues without the degradation mentioned earlier. If there is a disruption to this learning process, it will break the cumulative training effect and, over time, the training acumen of a whole generation of young officers will be impaired as the impetus and focus of training becomes blurred.

The success of Desert Storm, and its maneuver style of warfare, was directly related to the training experience brought to that war by its officers, non-commissioned officers and




Figure 2
Type of Training Experience
by Rank

soldiers.¹⁷ JRTC and CMTC systems came on-line late in this training period, but were definite contributors to Desert Storm success because of their utilization by light and European-based forces until deployment. One could say it took eighteen years to build for that victory. A similar period, eighteen years from now, might leave another legacy if the Army allows others, directly or indirectly, to refocus its training efforts.

Conclusions

Combat units must have CTC type resources to sustain warfighting ability and have the capability to execute maneuver warfare, on order. The practical experience gained by all participants during the training exercises provides them with skills which support the short war, minimal casualty belief. Division and higher training simulations provide adequate tools for the complementary skills required to successfully execute operational as well as strategic plans.

What does this all mean? When future historians write about the Army of the twentieth century they will identify Army leaders of that period as visionaries who led the Army through a metamorphosis in the 1970's and 1980's. The transformation which took place will be described as a pivotal era which introduced a new perspective on the conduct of modern warfare. The melding of

¹⁷The focus of the CTC training is the execution of joint operations. This training strategy could be perceived as a pure Army system. Far from the mark, every step is with joint operations in mind. Fact of the matter is, one of the realities commanders retain after experiencing a CTC is a greater appreciation for how to work with other-than-ground-combat units and how they contribute to success on the battlefield.

a nation's psyche(short war and minimal casualties) with the realities of conflicts of the late decades of the twentieth century(reduced military forces ready for combat) requires a force trained for maneuver warfare with all of the complexities associated with joint and combined operations. The popular term, "executing war at the Phd level" can be attributed to this form of warfare. The ability to avoid known enemy strength and striking at sensitive and vulnerable centers of gravity requires a level of training available within the CTC system.²⁶ The days of attrition warfare can be left to another age, as long as public and political support for CTC training does not recede. The challenge for Army leadership is to maintain that awareness, not only external to the Total Force but also within the body politic.

The journey the reader embarked on is almost complete. The training azimuth has now been set. Understanding the role of the National Guard in United States military history will provide the final mid-course correction before reaching the force structure which will sustain warfighting readiness.

CHAPTER 4

Role of the Total Army in the Future

The United States Army is actually facing two of its greatest challenges since the end of World War II. The first, determining the roles and missions of the military, is being addressed by the Army along with its sister services. The second, determining the roles and missions for each component of the Total Army, is for the Army to solve by itself. Both aim right at the heart of the Army force structure but the second issue has the potential of adversely impacting on its readiness for war and thus inflicting the greatest harm on the Army.

This chapter will focus on the latter because the Army's challenge is more than just defining what the total force will look like and which component does what missions. The Army has to ensure its three components, Active Army, National Guard and Army Reserve, project a united front in the development and presentation of the recommendation.¹⁸

Background

The Total Army has received praise as an effective force which contributed greatly to the recent military victory in Operation Desert Storm. The success of active divisions and corps underscored the large investment in military technology and

¹⁸It must be emphasized that the Total Force strategy will have to be a tri-component position and acknowledged that each component is dependent on the other. Suffice it to say the same process will be required to solve other types of Active/Army Reserve and Guard/Army Reserve issues.

training made over the past fifteen years. A significant portion(as mentioned earlier) of the success can be attributed to current training doctrine, specifically, the command and control(C²) displayed by commanders and their staffs from battalion through corps level. The reserves were used to augment theater forces, backfill active units in USAREUR, and directly contributed to the American public's support of the war by the mobilization of hundreds of units and thousands of personnel from across the country.²⁷

There were weaknesses with the Total Army. Mobilization uncovered a serious deficiency in the readiness posture of the National Guard, particularly combat arms C² at battalion and brigade level. The conscious decision not to deploy the roundout brigade with the 24th Mechanized Division and the notoriety of the Guard brigade at the National Training Center are well documented. This deficiency, in its own right, did not jeopardize the Gulf operation; but today it does jeopardize the process for determining the future mix of the Army. The Guard lost faith with its active brethren over this incident.¹⁹

The Guard training strategy, developed in the seventies and eighties, specified increasing resources for certain units that were to maintain higher readiness levels to deploy with their active counterparts. Every year active duty personnel evaluated

¹⁹My impression from listening to guest lecturers, fellow student reserve officers and the apparent lack of Guard action to facilitate the CSA's proposal for reserve cutbacks.

Guard proficiency. The evaluations, accumulated over a decade, were perceived by the Guard as affirming the ability of those units to accompany their active divisions into combat. The notoriety this shortfall received by the media compounded the Guards' consternation. The feelings that were generated laid the seeds of discord which must be dealt with now, by all sides, before genuine progress on future force structure can be made.

Concurrent with the Desert Storm period the downsizing of the Army was gaining momentum. The reductions initiated by the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreements continued as additional cuts brought about by the new national security strategy and the increasing pressure for DOD to provide a peace dividend gained momentum - then the rules for downsizing changed. The CSA presented a plan in the summer of 1992 for a proportional cut in units from the Guard and Army Reserve. The Army failed to account for the strong political backlash from Congress and the states. Personnel to be cut from the Guard units came from federal and state voting districts. The recession was already causing lost jobs, the politicians were not going to be accused of standing idly by while the Army did the same thing. Could the Guard have influenced local political opinion? Whether it could or not is debatable, but it was not in the Guard's self-interest to take action.

The quandary the senior leadership of the Army faces today is to formulate a force structure best suited to fight America's future wars within the context of its track record with the

reserve components.

Can it be done?

Will the reserves assist in formulating a successful strategy?

Will the politicians buy it?

One must understand how the country developed its militia and how the militia concept developed America's perception of it before these questions can be answered.

America and its Militia

"To place any dependence upon a militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff... If I were called upon to declare upon oath whether the militia had been most serviceable or hurtful, upon the whole I should subscribe to the latter...."

George Washington
after the Battle of Long Island
1776

"A well organized militia; upon a Plan that will pervade all the States, and introduce similarity in their Maneuvers, Establishment, Exercise and Arms."

George Washington's
recommendation to Congress,
"Sentiments on a Peace
Establishment," 1783

The views expressed by George Washington are an excellent example of the paradox that exists till this day.²⁸ The Father of our Country considered the creation and maintenance of a militia as one of the four essential factors for national defense.²⁹ Yet, since the earliest years of America's birth, it

is well documented that the militia has never been able to meet its military requirements.³⁰ Why this dilemma?

1607 - 1780

The character of today's Army National Guard began long ago when the militia concept migrated to North America with the colonists. The period of its acceptance and transformation into an American institution was from 1607 until 1780.³¹ The early American settlement's only protection from Native American attack was through self defense. Settlers kept their firearms handy and as they went about their daily business were always ready to run to the sound of the guns and defend their own and their neighbors' property. The number of casualties sustained during this era as a percentage of the total population is said to be the worst ever experienced by the United States.³²

Recurrent attacks occurred throughout this period, but the survival of the new nation was never in question after 1675 because of the magnitude of European migration and subsequent development of new settlements. The westward expansion meant that only perimeter settlements would be threatened.³³ This feeling of security and the ideological basis for serving in the militia gave the United States a unique character when compared to the European model. The social structure of early American society was based on men being free. There was no social caste system requiring service in the militia, so the only obligation was one of necessity.³⁴ The security from direct attack as settlers moved further from the coastline and America's strategic

location across the ocean made defense of the homeland and survival a mute point. The need for military efficiency was sacrificed by this colonial circumstance.³⁵ The militia attitude of "get along by going along" was indicative of a liberal society and usually precluded the toughness and ruthlessness necessary in the conduct of warfare.³⁶

1775 - 1815

The period from 1775 until 1815 was one which saw many military conflicts and many debates over the worthiness of a militia and/or a standing army. The Revolutionary War required use of a standing army because the militia did not have the capability to prosecute a disciplined, large scale operation. A practice began during this period where regular army officers were given the top command positions in militia units, displacing their reserve counterparts.³⁷ This action created tension between regular and reserve components then as it would today.

The standing army versus militia debates which followed the Revolutionary War brought out numerous editorials which formed the basis for the Constitutional provisions. Alexander Hamilton, in the Federalist papers, championed the virtues of the militia but was outspoken on the virtues of a standing army and the deficiencies of the militia.³⁸ James Madison considered the notion of a standing army dangerous, but a necessary provision.³⁹

The Militia Act of 1792 provided the implementing instructions for the constitutional rhetoric.⁴⁰ A strict interpretation of the limits of federal power in training and

length of service insured poor discipline, inadequate training and organizational structure.⁴¹

The organization of the militia centered on the company. This size unit fit the small town model for establishing a self-contained unit with volunteers from the community. The company commander would be elected by popular vote and normally the quality of this commander would determine the level of participation and discipline of the unit. Training was dependent on other criteria. Units in rural areas would focus on marksmanship and only the simplest forms of company movement.⁴² Units from towns and cities would be able to progress further, accomplishing more precise forms of unit maneuver.⁴³ Larger unit activities normally occurred once or twice a year and focused on family picnics or festivals.⁴⁴ The reservation of appointments of officers by the state government set a course for civil leadership and political connections being the qualifications rather than proven military leadership and performance for officer status.⁴⁵

The military conflicts during this period can be characterized as minor. There was no survival threat to the United States and the belligerent parties involved in these conflicts were preoccupied with more pressing concerns on the continent of Europe.

1815 - 1915

The next one hundred years were a period in the National Guard's history where little change occurred, the Civil War being

an anomaly, no lessons were learned and rightfully so.⁴⁶ The isolationist policies of the United States, and the evolving skirmishes with the Native American tribes were kept on the frontier and away from the established towns and cities. America's strategic location and preoccupation with industrial expansion actually deterred aggression (with the exception of Mexico) and provided the militia unit of the nineteenth century with little to do and little to train for, local traditions continued throughout this period.⁴⁷

The period around World War I was an awakening of the American giant. Technology began to make its appearance. The time required to transit the oceans and America's strategic distance was reduced. Communications improved as message and voice traffic reached real time. The desire to establish itself as a world power and take part in international politics required the formation and maintenance of a standing army.⁴⁸

Laws passed during this period, particularly the Dick Act, wrested control the state governments had over their Guard units and established the force structure in use today.⁴⁹ This Act provided federal funding for state National Guard units with the stipulation that the federal government would have first call-up rights when required. The animosity the American public has always had for federal control over the states was fueled by this act, but world events necessitated the change.

The beginning of the twentieth century found the Guard very active and effective within its state functions. The small unit

and hometown orientation gave the units esprit de corps and a level of cohesion rarely felt in the active force.⁵⁰ Popular support was always high for the local Guard unit even when it was necessary for Guard intervention. The Guard had always been used during natural and man-made disasters and during the industrial riots of 1890 - 1905 and the union strikes after the turn of the century.⁵¹

1915 - Present

America's involvement in the world wars, as well as the conflicts during the Cold War continued the long standing animosities between the Guard and the regular force. The regular Army leadership habitually disregarded unit lineage by displacing Guard leadership.⁵² Guard units which had trained for years were disbanded and their members used for individual replacement.⁵³

The Guard, by its nature, had a large and independent political as well as popular base of support. The love/hate relationship would continue, with periods of remission during the intervals between the wars. The regular force, by its nature, had a use for the Guard, but on its own terms. These differing outlooks would meet again in the 1990's as they realize, possibly for the first time, that each require the other to meet future challenges brought about by world events and domestic needs.

Discussion

This is not an attempt to denigrate the National Guard. It is unquestionably a pillar on which the freedom enjoyed by the United States rests. The preceding discussion is to prepare the

reader, or more precisely the Army leadership, for an objective approach for deciding the future of the Total Force. The Guard brings with it a long heritage with a number of strengths and weaknesses (figure 3).

Strengths:	Weaknesses:
-Company focus & cohesion	-Training time available
-Grass roots base	-Large unit operations
-Local orientation	-Senior tacticians
-Least costly	-Crisis response

Figure 3
National Guard Traits

The National Guard, because of its nature is one of the most successful pressure groups in the political system.⁵⁴ Founded in the Constitution it is an official institution but still able to lobby Congress. It is the only part of government with a military charter for public defense.⁵⁵ This group power is a strength which must be used for the collective benefit of the Total Force.

CHAPTER 5

The recommendations for changes to the Total Force structure will be discussed in two parts. Section I will focus on the active force. The objective will be to define the optimal division force structure which will support; the CTC training system; mission challenges expected for the future; and, the quality of life for the soldier and his or her family. Section II will focus on the future role for the National Guard and the inter-weaving of force structures between regular and reserve combat units, both in peacetime and in wartime.

The analysis in both sections draws its foundation from the preceding chapters. The American public by nature is drawn to the reality of the moment. Forces in the environment (e.g. politicians, media, and current events) draw the public's attention away from matters of national security, particularly during periods when a perceived threat is no longer a motivational impetus. The implications of this phenomena are threefold: today's military officer corps is solely responsible for ensuring tomorrow's warfighting ability is sustained; the protection of tomorrow's younger generation is being decided by today's decisions; innovative approaches to meeting the challenges facing the Total Force can only be solved from within, and will be solved from within if the regular and reserve leadership can overcome the dysfunctional traditions of each component's past.

Section I

The benchmark for sustaining warfighting ability was described earlier in chapter 3. The underpinnings of that concept were; the continuation of the CTC approach to training, adequate preparation time and the active involvement of senior commanders in training exercises. Tomorrow's forces would be able to accomplish that objective if one could depend on a period of world peace where training would be the only concern of the military. Recent missions to Somalia and implications of future peacekeeping, peacemaking or disaster assistance portrays a world in which the active force will be required to conduct operational missions concurrent with training requirements.

Can both be done effectively?

The eighteen division force of the 1980's was able to absorb the operational missions without a degradation in force readiness because of its size, the ability to rotate units to sustain those missions and the infrequency of operations. The future will not afford that luxury to the twelve or less division force. The frequency of operational missions will increase and the reliance on light forces to react will have to be replaced with the realization that heavy maneuver units will have to provide the manpower. The smaller force will mean multiple rotations for personnel. Army experience has shown this to be a major detractor to quality of life and the retention of quality personnel.

Solution #1 The Heavy Division Answer

The optimal number of CONUS-based divisions for the active force is: eight(8). The Army can sustain its warfighting capability, meet anticipated non-combat related missions and minimize quality of life detractors with the maintenance of these eight heavy divisions in CONUS.²⁰

The venue for training the heavy division is the NTC. An eight division force means that eighty maneuver battalions would have access to this training center. The eighty battalions are part of twenty-four brigades. The brigade rotation to the NTC offers the optimal use of resources and effectively trains the colonel commander and his staff at maneuvering a two battalion task force.²¹ This package focuses the appropriate divisional and corps support units doctrinally expected to support the battalion, some of which support through the command and control of the brigade headquarters.

The OPFOR regiment, a two-battalion organization which provides an excellent training vehicle for the visiting brigade package to train against is a resource intensive tool which means

²⁰For purposes of this discussion the armor division is comprised of three brigades, two armor heavy and one balanced, the mechanized division is comprised of three brigades, two mech heavy and one balanced.

²¹The NTC can accommodate a third battalion as brigade reserve. This capability can be used effectively to train a new battalion commander and his staff in a command post exercise. Caution is advised on believing a third full-up battalion should be used every time. Few home-station training programs, installation support and other mission requirements can sustain a whole brigade in a dedicated NTC training cycle.

rotating units must meet a minimal level of collective training to receive the full effect of the twenty-one day exercise. Mentioned earlier, this force package and the evaluator cadre can be cost effective with a minimum of ten rotations a year to the planned maximum of twenty rotations per year.

The final piece to this complex organism is the human element. Battalion commanders normally command for a two year period. This fits well into personnel career progression programs and provides a stable training environment for the unit personnel, some of which are assigned for three years, others for a lesser period of time, particularly if job responsibilities change. During a two year period the commander has the ability to apply his past training experiences into planning for his battalion's anticipated rotation to the NTC, conduct the training and then incorporate lessons learned into preparations for the next rotation. The synchronization of maneuver companies with fire support and force sustainment are highly complicated tasks that require sufficient time to move a unit whose personnel are constantly in flux, from the crawl, to the walk and finally, to the run stage of execution.

The brigade commander and his staff must learn the complex tasks associated with making the elements of combat power available to the battalion. Appropriate time must be provided so that brigade staff operations enhance subordinate operations rather than hinder it.

Now, the question previous. Can both be done effectively?

Yes, by providing the brigade and battalions with the following timetable (figure 4):

	<u>time period</u>	<u>task description</u>
	6 months	NTC train-up
	-----1 month	NTC rotation
	2 month	Other mission planning
18 months	6 months	Deployment
	2 months	Refit/support
	6 months	NTC train-up
	-----1 month	NTC rotation

Figure 4

Brigade Training Cycle

This means that each brigade will rotate every seventeen to nineteen months. Trying to force a battalion or brigade towards a more frequent rotation, say every twelve to fourteen months would be counterproductive from the training viewpoint and unrealistic from the other mission needs of the Army. Every maneuver battalion commander should receive at least one rotation to the NTC during his command. The frequency will provide a broad base of training experience for personnel on other replacement cycles.

The total number of scheduled yearly rotations will be fifteen rotations (well within the planning figures) and includes

necessary downtime for Christmas events and environmental restoration(Appendix A).

The CMTC provides a similar training venue for forces in Europe. There are other similarities as well. The maneuver units require an eighteen month rotation, their tasks and training pace are the same as their CONUS counterparts. The dilemma faced in Europe is that there are only six heavy brigades which can field rotational units. Support of an OPFOR and an evaluator force is not cost effective with this usage rate. A decision point would be either the closing of this facility and subsequent degradation of unit readiness and personnel training experience or opening the facility to NATO forces to provide the appropriate rotational frequency to U. S. forces.

Solution #2 The Light Division Answer

The optimal number of CONUS-based light divisions for the active force are: four(4). The discussion for the light force is similar to the heavy force. The venue for training the light force is the JRTC. A four division force means that thirty-six light battalions would have access to the training center. The thirty-six battalions are part of twelve brigades. The cost effective operation of a full time OPFOR and evaluator cadre differs from the NTC. Seven to nine rotations per year have been scheduled since its first rotation in 1987.⁵⁶ Using nine as a standard, the light brigade with a two battalion package, can expect to train every sixteen to eighteen months. Further usage can be achieved by including the Ranger Regiment.

Section II

Training has been the underlying thesis for how the active force must preserve its warfighting capability. The thrust of chapter 3 and its application in section I provided the reader with a perspective that the command and control relationship at the battalion and higher staff levels required the CTC training system to provide the level of readiness required to be an effective fighting force. The National Guard fits into the warfighting equation, no question, but it fits in at the level where it was first conceived to fit over three hundred years ago. The linchpin of the colonial militia system was the company commander and his unit. Today, with the complexities associated with modern maneuver warfare there is a place for the National Guard company on the battlefield.

Solution #3 The Total Force Combat Battalion Answer

The National Guard will provide one company to every heavy/light maneuver battalion in the regular force. Effective with this change, the active CONUS-based combat battalion would have a headquarters company, and three line companies.²² The fourth will be a roundout company from the National Guard.

The solution is realistic. Company level warfighting readiness is not as complex as higher command tasks. The Guard company would be able to train with its active counterparts with

²²The exception might be the 82nd Airborne Division. If requirements remain for strip alert and short notice phased deployment it would be infeasible for a Guard unit to be included.

less lost time. Unit esprit would continue within the company organization. The battalion command group, normally the most experienced leadership of the unit, would have the greater challenge of ensuring acceptance by the other companies, but it is not an insurmountable issue. CTC rotations would include the National Guard company. Training periods, coinciding with the active duty period would be determined by operational needs. Combat vehicles and related heavy equipment would be with the regular force, with applicable safeguards to ensure security.

The parent organizations of the National Guard companies would not necessarily be dissolved. Those force structures would continue with their state role as would the assigned companies. The traditional roles within the state such as riot control or disaster relief would still be supported by the Guard unit, as it has throughout its history. Those requirements have always been for light infantry operations, the equipment to fulfill the state mission would still be located at the respective Guard armories.

Solution #3-A The Cadre Division Answer

The issue of regular officers replacing Guard commanders would be reduced by this approach to Total Force reorganization. The question then becomes, during a national emergency what becomes of the headquarters structures when the line companies deployed with their active units?

The remaining organizations would perform missions similar to those of the cadre divisions. The training of replacement companies, combat crews, or squads for combat. This role would

reduce the peacetime structure of the Guard by two cadre divisions.

Conclusion

The essence of America's Army is its soldiers. The center of gravity of its Army is its training methods. Until the late 1970's one would not have been wrong to identify soldiers as both the essence of the Army as well as its center of gravity. The divergence began as senior Army leaders began a serious introspection and analysis of Army training procedures.

The Army is a player in national security affairs today because of its training ethos and can maintain that role if its training methods, resources and expertise stay as the Army's top priority. The second and third-order effects of how training impacts on the Army structure as a whole needs serious introspection. Soldiers are challenged by innovative training. They can sense when what they are doing is meaningful and productive. Junior leaders not only learn their roles and skills when performing in the train-up and execution at the combat training centers, but they can observe their superiors, taking those lessons learned into the future. The training process not only gives them the appropriate warfighting skills, but also provides the filtration system by which the competencies of the future leaders are developed.

The preservation of the Army training ethos must be the long-term goal for meeting the challenges of the future. When the Army leadership implements successive reduction policies,

whether in force structure, modernization or roles and missions the training "flame" must guide those decisions. Then the essence of the Army, its people, will focus their energies and creativity on solving those issues and ensuring the Army continues as a player on tomorrow's battlefield.

The justification discussed on the preceding pages can be described as a shift in the force development model from threat-based to training-based. That description would be correct. The statement that eight heavy divisions and four light divisions would be the optimal number in the active force can be stated another way: the prescribed force structure is the minimal number of divisions the active force structure requires to maintain itself as a viable instrument for future national policy.

The eight heavy and four light division CONUS-based force with its National Guard "round-up" would transfer approximately three hundred and sixty company-size units to the Guard. Retention of selected divisional and brigade command and control structures would reduce the Guard force structure by two cadre divisions. These reductions contribute to the smaller Army of the future without the loss in sustainment of warfighting ability when coupled with the training cycles described in section I.

The solution, optimal for training, also supports the career progression formulas both for the regular and Guard force. The trained manpower pool supported on the active side would provide the necessary experienced personnel to the TRADOC, AMC and MACOM

agencies over the long term to ensure that warfighting spirit would be incorporated in those organizations. Guard progression would continue within combat units as a better trained company soldier would be utilized at higher level Guard headquarters. Use of the higher headquarters would break the historic trend of mal-utilization experienced during periods of national emergency, while providing a career progression avenue as well as performing a valid peacetime and wartime task.

The capabilities described above will position the United States Army on the playing field as an active participant in the determination of its future. The Total Force leadership method of reaching consensus, its reliance on mutual trust and its ultimate presentation of the Army's solutions will determine who calls the first play.

	Month:	1..2..3..4..5..6..7..8..9..10..11..12..13
	Date:	J..F..M..A..M..J..J..A..S..O..N..D..J
Rotation		.
Number:		.
Christmas Break	-	.
1	-	.
2	-	.
3	-	.
4	-	.
5	-	.
6	-	.
7	-	.
8	-	.
9	-	.
10	-	.
11	-	.
Rehabilitation	-	.
12	-	.
13	-	.
14	-	.
15	-	.
Christmas Break	-	.

NOTE: "-|" Equates to a 21-day arrival to departure period.

APPENDIX 1

Proposed NTC Rotational Schedule

ENDNOTES

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⁸Training and Doctrine Command, Office of the Command Historian, The Army's Training Revolution 1973-1990 An Overview, by Anne W. Chapman, (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC Historical Series, 1991), 1.

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¹¹Ibid., 3.

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¹⁴Training and Doctrine Command, Office of the Command Historian, The Origins and Development of the National Training Center 1976 - 1984, by Anne W. Chapman, (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC Historical Series, 1992), 1.

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¹⁹Ibid., 19.

²⁰Ibid., 26.

²¹Ibid., 29.

²²Ibid., 54.

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²⁴Richard D. Hooker, Jr., "The Mythology Surrounding Maneuver Warfare," Parameters XXIII no. 3 (1993): 27.

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²⁷Seminar discussion with Col Max Wolters, USAR, on the role the Reserve Component played in cementing public support for Desert Storm, October 1992.

²⁸R. Ernest Dupuy, The National Guard: A Compact History, (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1971), viii.

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³⁰Robert L. Goldich, "Historical Continuity in the U.S. Military Reserve System," The Guard & Reserve in the Total Force, Edited by Bennie J. Wilson III, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985), 11.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid., 12.

³³Ibid., 12 - 13.

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³⁸Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 88.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Goldich, 15-16.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Mahon, 57.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Goldich, 20.

⁴⁷Ibid., 18.

⁴⁸Ibid., 20-21.

⁴⁹Mahon, 265.

⁵⁰Ibid., 1.

⁵¹Ibid., 264.

⁵²Ibid., 263.

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